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Dawn - March 20, 20008
Arrogance of power
By Javed Hussain
IN 1946 when the French returned to colonise Indo-China they had contemptuously dismissed Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist Vietminh, who were fighting for independence, as an amateur force whose commander General Nguyen Giap “is a non-commissioned officer learning to handle regiments”.
An American adviser with the French had wondered “how can the Vietminh be mobile when they don’t have vehicles and airplanes”? Eight years later, on May 7, 1954, the cream of the French army that was sent to Vietnam surrendered to General Giap at Dien Bien Phu.
Eleven years later, when the US Marines landed on the beaches of Da Nang on March 8, 1965, history was poised to repeat itself as the Americans were poised to repeat the mistakes made by the French. They had come with the belief that the ‘racially inferior gooks’ would not stand up to the superiority of American arms. They soon discovered that their belief was entirely misplaced. They dropped 7.8 million tons of bombs of all kinds (they had dropped 2.06 million tons in the Second World War), and sprayed 75 million litres of defoliants including dioxin over the fields, forests and villages of South Vietnam. Yet the resistance not only continued, it grew in intensity.
Ten years later, having employed everything in their conventional arsenal, the superpower withdrew, defeated, disgraced and traumatised. Their arrogance had caused seven million Vietnamese casualties including three million dead. This qualifies the Americans for trial for war crimes committed against the people of Vietnam.
In December 1979, the other superpower, in arrogant defiance of history, invaded another Asian country in the belief that their invincible army would change the way of life in Afghanistan, and with it the geopolitical dynamics of the region. It also took them ten years to realise that they were wrong. They too withdrew in a blaze of humiliation. Their arrogance had caused one million Afghan deaths. The Russians too qualify for trial for war crimes committed against the people of Afghanistan.
The French, American and Soviet armies were trained for conventional warfare against an enemy whose dispositions are known. It is characterised by employment of large forces in operations that are designed to create a series of effects on the adversary until he is forced to fight with reversed front, which is a prelude to his destruction.
Guerrilla warfare has a totally different character. It is characterised by small-scale engagements at the time and place of the guerrillas’ choosing. While the army seeks battle, guerrillas avoid it. They do everything to attack the minds of the soldiers, for once the mind is defeated, the war is won. They are kept updated on the enemy’s dispositions by their wide intelligence network which is supported by the people. The army lacks this facility as they lack people’s support and as the guerrillas keep moving from one location to another. That is why the concept of ‘search and destroy’ was evolved by the Americans in Vietnam and followed by the Soviets in Afghanistan.
An infamous incident in 1968 exemplifies this flawed concept. Lieutenant William Calley was ordered to take his platoon to search for Vietcong in the village of Mai Lai. They found none. In anger, they massacred 347 villagers.
The American and Soviet soldiers found it difficult to adapt to the clandestine nature of guerrilla warfare. And as most of them were conscripts, the transition became even more difficult. They lost interest in the war as they could not relate to the cause they were sent to fight for. Protracted deployment made it even worse; there was widespread drug-taking, drunkenness and lack of discipline. Their morale had dropped to such depths that fast rotation of troops had to be carried out. Thus, six million US troops passed through Vietnam and one million Soviet troops through Afghanistan.
As the performance of American and Soviet infantry dropped, their commanders came to rely more and more on air- and land-delivered firepower. This used to result in extensive collateral damage which, instead of cowing the people into submission, strengthened their resolve to defeat the enemy.
History is now repeating itself in Afghanistan and Iraq because the Americans are repeating mistakes. Their visions of swift victories have been shattered. Service in the two theatres is having a corrosive effect on the morale of their soldiers. They are again being made to pay for their folly of underestimating the skill and fortitude of Asian guerrilla fighters. Belatedly they have learned that it is far more difficult to withdraw than it was to go in. The White House and Pentagon find the comparison odious, but the fact is that the ghost of Vietnam has returned to haunt them.
There are three options available to them:
One, stay on till the objectives are achieved. This would entail protracted deployment and putting up with all its ill effects, in an operational environment that would only become worse with time and thus trigger widespread anti-war demonstrations in America.
Two, withdraw from both theatres now. In the event, apart from carrying the stigma of another ignominious defeat by Asian guerrillas, withdrawal would plunge both Afghanistan and Iraq into civil war in which collaborators of the US would be wiped out.
Three, concede defeat in Iraq, withdraw forces from there and deploy them in Afghanistan. In response, the Taliban will revert to classic guerrilla tactics which, in effect, would greatly neutralise the induction of reinforcements. Besides, an upsurge in activity by American infantry would give the Taliban an opportunity to strike at many more targets.
More importantly, the third option has wider implications for Pakistan. Since the reinforced US-led forces would plan to conduct relentless operations against the Taliban, they would expect and demand that the Pakistan Army isolate the tribal areas from the Afghan theatre. This would entail the launching of a massive effort by the Pakistan Army, an undertaking that would evoke equally massive retaliation by the insurgents, not only in the tribal areas but across the country.
The insurgency in Balochistan, which is of low intensity, will begin to intensify as the covert support it is getting from the intelligence services of our eastern and western neighbours will also intensify. The flames of insurgency would thus engulf Pakistan.
Protracted military operations against one’s own people carry with them the germs of disaffection. They would exert inexorable pressure on the Pashtun, more so on Pashtun soldiers. The reaction of Bengali soldiers to the army crackdown in March 1971 in East Pakistan should not be forgotten.
The Americans would like nothing better than to see the battle of Afghanistan being fought in Pakistan by the Pakistan Army. It does not matter to them what happens to Pakistan as long as they get what they want. And what they ultimately want goes well beyond the tribal areas. In the event, Pakistan would have to tread the future with prudence.
Since history is one of America’s blind spots, the Americans are once again counting the cost of their failure to learn from it. They can still make amends by swallowing their arrogance and going home, resolving never to defy history again.
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